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This article reviews thermodynamic relationships in the brain in an attempt to consolidate
current research in systems neuroscience. The present synthesis supports proposals
that thermodynamic information in the brain can be quantified to an appreciable degree
of objectivity, that many qualitative properties of information in systems of the brain can
be inferred by observing changes in thermodynamic quantities, and that many features
of the brain’s anatomy and architecture illustrate relatively simple information-energy
relationships. The brain may provide a unique window into the relationship between
energy and information.
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INTRODUCTION
That information is physical has been suggested by evidence since the founding of classical
thermodynamics (Lloyd, 2006; Gleick, 2011). In recent years, Landauer’s principle (Landauer,
1996; Bennett, 2003), which relates information-theoretic entropy to thermodynamic information,
has been confirmed (Parrondo et al., 2015), and the experimental demonstration of a form of
information-energy equivalence (Alfonso-Faus, 2013) has verified that Maxwell’s demon cannot
violate any known laws of thermodynamics (Maruyama et al., 2009). The theoretical finding
that entropy is conserved as event horizon area is leading to the resolution of the black hole
information paradox (Davies, 2010; Moskowitz, 2015), and there is a fundamental relationship
between information and the geometry of spacetime itself (Bousso, 2002; Eling et al., 2006). Current
formulations of quantum theory are revealing properties of physical information (Wheeler, 1986;
Brukner and Zeilinger, 2003; Lloyd, 2006; Vedral, 2010), and information-interpretive attempts to
show that gravity is quantized (Smolin, 2001; Lee et al., 2013) could even lead to the unification
of quantum mechanics and the theories of relativity. Although similar approaches are increasingly
influential in biology (Schneider and Sagan, 2005; England, 2013; Flack, 2014), “a formalization of
the relationship between information and energy is currently lacking in neuroscience” (Collell and
Fauquet, 2015). The purpose of this article is to explore a few different sides of this relationship
and, along the way, to suggest that many hypotheses and theories in neuroscience can be unified
by the physics of information.
INFORMATION BOUNDS
“How can the events in space and time which take place within the spatial boundary of a living organism
be accounted for by physics and chemistry?” – (Schrödinger, 1944, from Friston, 2013).
As a fundamental physical entity (Lloyd, 2015), information is not fully understood, and
there is currently a significant amount of disagreement over different definitions of information
and entropy in the literature (Poirier, 2014; Ben-Naim, 2015). In thermodynamics, however,
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information can be defined as a negation of thermodynamic
entropy (Beck, 2009):
I ≡ −S
A bit of thermodynamic entropy represents the distinction
between two alternative states in a physical system (Stone,
2015). As a result, the total thermodynamic entropy of a
system is proportional to the total number of distinguishable
states contained in the system (Bekenstein, 2001, 2007). Because
thermodynamic entropy is potential information relative to an
observer (Lloyd, 2006), and an observer in a physical system is a
component of the system itself, the total thermodynamic entropy
of a system includes the portion of entropy that is accessible to the
observer as relative thermodynamic information (Wheeler, 1989;
Collell and Fauquet, 2015):
Irelative = Stotal − Srelative
Since entropy in any physical system is finite (Lloyd, 2006;
Rovelli, 2015), the total thermodynamic entropy of any system of
the brain can be quantified by applying the traditional form of the
universal (Bekenstein, 1981, 1984, 2001, 2004, 2007) information-
entropy bound:
Ssys = ζAEkh¯c
where A is area, E is energy including matter, h¯ is the reduced
Planck constant, c is the speed of light, k is Boltzmann’s constant,
and ζ is a factor such that 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1.
Setting this factor to 1 in order to quantify the total
thermodynamic entropy of a system at a certain level of structure
now allows us to quantify thermodynamic information by
partitioning the factor into a relative information component
(ζI=1−ζs ) and a relative entropy component (ζs=1−ζI ),
Isys = ζI AEkh¯c = (1− ζs)
AEk
h¯c
Because a maximal level of energy corresponds to a maximal level
of thermodynamic information, and a minimal level of energy
corresponds to a minimal level of thermodynamic information
(Duncan and Semura, 2004), any transitions between energy
levels occur as transitions between informational extrema. So, in
the event that information enters a system of the brain,
1Isys = 1EsyskT = 1ζI
where T is temperature. And, in the case that information exits a
system,
−1Isys = 1EsurrkT = 1ζs
Various forms of these relationships, including information-
entropy bounds, have been applied in neuroscience (Friston,
2010; Sengupta et al., 2013a,c, 2016; Collell and Fauquet, 2015;
Sterling and Laughlin, 2015). The contribution of this review
is simply to show that these relationships can be united into a
common theoretical framework.
NEUROBIOLOGY
“. . . classical thermodynamics. . . is the only physical theory of
universal content which I am convinced, that within the framework
of applicability of its basic concepts, will never be overthrown.” –
(Einstein, 1949, from Bekenstein, 2001).
This section reviews thermodynamic relationships in systems
neuroscience with a focus on information and energy. Beginning
with neurons, moving to neural networks, and concluding at the
level of the brain as a whole, I discuss the energetics of processes
such as learning and memory, excitation and inhibition, and the
production of noise in neurobiological systems.
The central role of energy in determining the activity of
neurons exposes the close connection between information and
thermodynamics at the level of the cell. For instance, the process
of depolarization, which occurs as a transition to Emax from
a resting state Emin, clearly shows that cellular information
content is correlated with energy levels. In this respect, the
resemblance between ion concentration gradients in neurons and
temperature gradients in thermodynamic demons (i.e., agents
that use information from their surroundings to decrease their
thermodynamic entropy) is not a coincidence – in order to
acquire information, neurons must expend energy to establish
proper membrane potentials. Recall that Landauer’s principle
(Plenio and Vitelli, 2001; Parrondo et al., 2015) places a lower
bound on the quantity of energy released into the surroundings
with the removal of information from a system. Thus,
reestablishing membrane potentials after depolarization – the
neuronal equivalent of resetting a demon’s memory – dissipates
energy. Because Landauer’s principle applies to all levels of
structure, and cells process large quantities of information,
neurons use energy efficiently despite operating at several orders
of magnitude above the nominal limit. Parameters including
membrane area, spiking frequency, and axon length have all
been optimized over the course of evolution to allow neurons
to process information efficiently (Sterling and Laughlin, 2015).
Examining the energetics of information processing in neurons
reinforces the notion that, while it is often convenient to imagine
the neuron to be a simple binary element, these cells are intricate
computational structures that process more than one bit of
information.
Relationships between information and energy can also be
seen at the level of neural networks. Attractor networks naturally
stabilize by seeking energy minima, and the relative positions of
basins of attraction define the geometry of an energy landscape
(Amit, 1992). As a result, the transition into an active attractor
state occurs as a transition into an information-energy maximum.
These transitions correspond to the generation of informational
entities such as memories, decisions, and perceptual events (Rolls,
2012). In this way, the energy basins of attractor networks may be
analogous to lower-level cellular and molecular energy gradients;
a transition between any number of distinguishable energy
levels follows the passage of a finite quantity of information.
Since processing information requires the expenditure of energy,
competitive network features also underscore the need to
minimize unnecessary information processing. Lateral inhibition
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at this level may optimize thermodynamic efficiency by reducing
metabolic expenses associated with networks responding less
robustly to entering signals. Another interesting thermodynamic
property of networks concerns macrostates: the functional
states of large-scale neural networks rest emergently on the
states of neuronal assemblies (Yuste, 2015). As a result, new
computational properties may arise with the addition of new
layers of network structure. Finally, the energetic cost of
information has influenced network connectivity by imposing
selective pressures to save energy by minimizing path length
between network nodes (Bullmore and Sporns, 2009).
Again, in accordance with Landauer’s principle, the
displacement of information from any system releases energy
into the surroundings (Plenio and Vitelli, 2001; Duncan
and Semura, 2004). This principle can be understood by
imagining an idealized memory device, such as the brain of
a thermodynamic demon. Since information is conserved
(Susskind and Hrabovsky, 2014), and clearing a memory erases
information, the thermodynamic entropy of the surroundings
must increase when a demon refreshes its memory to update
information. This fundamental connection between information,
entropy, and energy appears in many areas of the neurobiology
of learning. For example, adjusting a firing threshold in order to
change the probability that a system will respond to a conditioned
stimulus (Takeuchi et al., 2014; Choe, 2015) optimizes engram
fitness by minimizing the quantity of energy needed for its
activation (Still et al., 2012). Recurrent collateral connections
further increase engram efficiency by enabling a minimal nodal
stimulus to elicit its full energetic activation (Rolls, 2012).
Experimental evidence also shows that restricting synaptic
energy supply impairs the formation of stable engrams (Harris
et al., 2012). Because the formation and disassembly of engrams
during learning and forgetting optimizes the growth and pruning
of networks in response to external conditions, the process of
learning is itself a mechanism for minimizing entropy in the
brain (Friston, 2003).
As another example of a multiscale process integrated
across many levels by thermodynamics, consider the active
balance between excitation and inhibition in neurobiological
systems. Maintaining proper membrane potentials and adequate
concentrations of signaling molecules requires the expenditure of
energy, so it is advantageous for systems of the brain to minimize
the processing of unnecessary information – to “send only what
is needed” (Sterling and Laughlin, 2015). Balancing excitation
and inhibition is therefore a crucial mechanism for saving
energy. Theoretical evidence that this balancing maximizes the
thermodynamic efficiency of processing Shannon information
(Sengupta et al., 2013b) is consistent with experimental findings
in several areas of research on inhibition. For instance, constant
inhibitory modulation is needed to stabilize internal states, and
hyperexcitation (e.g., in epilepsy, intoxication syndromes, or
trauma) can decrease relative information by reducing levels
of consciousness (Haider et al., 2006; Lehmann et al., 2012).
Likewise, selective attention is mediated by the activation of
inhibitory interneurons (Houghton and Tipper, 1996), and
sensory inhibition appears to sharpen internal perceptual states
(Isaacson and Scanziani, 2011). The need to balance excitation
and inhibition at all levels of structure highlights the energetic
cost of information.
A final example worth discussing is the relationship between
thermodynamics and the production of noise in neurobiological
systems. Noise is present in every system of the brain, and
influences all aspects of the organ’s function (Faisal et al.,
2008; Rolls and Deco, 2010; Destexhe and Rudolph-Lilith,
2012). Even in the absence of any potential forms of classical
stochastic resonance, the noise-driven exploration of different
states may optimize thermodynamic efficiency by allowing a
system to randomly sample different accessible configurations.
Theoretical arguments suggest indeed that noise enables neural
networks to respond more quickly to detected signals (Rolls,
2012), and empirical evidence implicates noise as a beneficial
means of optimizing the performance of diverse neurobiological
processes (McDonnell and Ward, 2011). For example, noise
in the form of neuronal DNA breaking (Guo et al., 2011;
Herrup et al., 2013; Tognini et al., 2015) could enhance
plasticity, since any stochastically optimized configuration would
be more likely to survive over time as, in this case, a
strengthened connection in a modifiable network. Because noise
is a form of relative entropy, optimizing the signal-to-noise
ratio in any neurobiological system promotes the efficient use of
energy.
At the level of the brain as a whole, the connection
between information and thermodynamics is readily apparent
in the organ’s functional reliance on energy (Magistretti and
Allaman, 2015), its seemingly disproportionate consumption
of oxygen and energy substrates (e.g., ATP, glucose, ketones,
etc.; Raichle and Gusnard, 2002; Herculano-Houzel, 2011), its
vulnerability to hypoxic-ischemic damage (Lutz et al., 2003;
Dreier et al., 2013) and in the reduction of consciousness
often conferred by the onset of energy restrictions (Shulman
et al., 2009; Stender et al., 2016). All fMRI, PET, and EEG
interpretation rests on the foundational assumption that changes
in the information content of neurobiological systems can be
inferred by observing energy changes (Attwell and Iadecola,
2002; Collell and Fauquet, 2015), and it is well known
that the information processing capacities of neurobiological
systems are limited by energy supply (Howarth et al., 2012;
Fox, 2015). Overall, these relationships are consistent with
the form of information-energy equivalence predicted by
Landauer’s principle and information-entropy bounds. The
living brain appears to maintain a state of thermodynamic
optimization.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND FREE WILL
“. . . science appears completely to lose from sight the large and
general questions; but all the more splendid is the success when,
groping in the thicket of special questions, we suddenly find a small
opening that allows a hitherto undreamt of outlook on the whole.” –
(Boltzmann, 1892, from Von Baeyer, 1999).
Although neuroscience has yet to explain consciousness or
free will at any satisfactory level of detail, relationships between
information and energy seem to be recognizable even at this level
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of analysis. This section reviews attempts to conceptualize major
properties of consciousness (unity, continuity, complexity, and
self-awareness) as features of information processing in the brain,
and concludes with a discussion of free will.
At any given moment, awareness is experienced as a unified
whole. Physical information is the substrate of consciousness
(Annila, 2016), and the law of conservation of information
requires any minimal unit of information to be transferred
into a thermodynamic system as a temporally unitary quantity.
As a result, it is possible that the passage of perceptual
time itself occurs secondarily to the transfer of information,
and that the information present in any integrated system
of the brain at any observed time is necessarily cohesive
and temporally unified. In this framework, the passage of
time would vary in proportion to a system’s rate of energy
dissipation. Although it is possible that physical systems in
general exchange information in temporally unitary quantities,
it is likely that many of the familiar features of the perceptual
unity of consciousness require the structure and activity of
neural networks in the brain. The biological basis of this
unity may be the active temporal consolidation of observed
events by integrated higher-order networks (Revonsuo, 1999;
Varela et al., 2001; Greenfield and Collins, 2005; Dehaene
and Changeux, 2011). An informational structure generated
by the claustrum has been speculated to contribute to this
experiential unity (Crick and Koch, 2005; Koubeissi et al.,
2014), but it has also been reported that complete unilateral
resection of the system performed in patients with neoplastic
lesions of the region produces no externally observable
changes in subjective awareness (Duffau et al., 2007). Overall,
it appears unlikely that the presence of information in
any isolated or compartmentalized network of the brain is
responsible for generating the unified nature of conscious
experience.
While perceptual time is likely the product of a collection of
related informational processes rather than a single, globalized
function mediated by any one specific system of the brain, some
of the perceptual continuity of consciousness may result from
the effectively continuous flow of thermodynamic information
into and out of integrated systems of the brain. In this
framework, the quantum (Prokopenko and Lizier, 2014) of
perceptual time would be the minimal acquisition of information,
and the entrance of information into neurobiological systems
would occur alongside the entrance of energy. This relationship
is implicit in the simple observation that the transition of
a large-scale attractor network is progressively less discrete
and smoother in time than the activation of a small-scale
engram, the propagation of a cellular potential, the docking
of a vesicle, the release of an ion, and so forth. Likewise,
electroencephalography shows that the summation of a large
number of discrete cellular potentials can accumulate into
an effectively continuous wave as a network field potential
(Nunez and Srinivasan, 2006), disruptions of which are often
correlated with decreases in levels of consciousness (Blumenfeld
and Taylor, 2003). It is also well known that higher frequency
network oscillations tend to indicate states of wakefulness
and active awareness, while lower frequency oscillations tend
to be associated with internal states of lesser passage of
perceptual time, such as dreamless sleep or unconsciousness.
The possibility that the experiential arrow of time and the
thermodynamic arrow of time share a common origin in the
flow of information is supported both by general models of
time in neuroscience and the physical interpretation of time
as an entropy gradient (Stoica, 2008; Mlodinow and Brun,
2014).
The subjective complexity of consciousness may show
that extensive network integration is needed for maximizing
the mutual thermodynamic information and internal energy
content of systems of the brain (Torday and Miller, 2016).
An exemplary structure enabling such experience, likely one
of many that together account for the subjective complexity
of consciousness, is the thalamocortical complex (Calabrò
et al., 2015; Hannawi et al., 2015). The functional architecture
of such a network may show that, at any given moment
in the internal model of a living brain, a wide range of
integrated systems are sharing mutual sources of thermodynamic
information. This pattern of structure may reveal that the
perceptual depth and complexity of conscious experience
is a direct product of recognizable features of the physical
brain. However, it also seems that extensive local cortical
processing of information is necessary for producing a refined
and coherent sensorium within a system, and that both the
thalamocortical complex and the brain stem are involved
in generating the subjective complexity of consciousness
(Edelman et al., 2011; Ward, 2011). The dynamics of attractor
networks at higher levels of network structure may show
that quantities of complex internal information can be
observed as changes in cortical energy landscapes (Rolls,
2012), with a transition between attractor states following the
transfer of information. The degree of subjective complexity
of information enclosed by such a transition would be
proportional to the degree of structural integration of underlying
networks.
Self-awareness likely arose as a survival necessity rather
than as an accident of evolution (Fabbro et al., 2015), and
rudimentary forms of self-awareness likely began to appear
early in the course of brain evolution as various forms of
perceptual self-environment separation. As a simple example,
consider the tickle response (Linden, 2007), which requires the
ability to differentiate self-produced tactile sensations from those
produced by external systems. The early need to distinguish
between self-produced tactile states and those produced by more
threatening non-self sources may be reflected by the observation
that this recognition process is mediated to a great extent by
the cerebellum (Blakemore et al., 2000). While it is possible
that other similar developments began occurring very early
on, the evolutionary acquisition of the refined syntactical and
conceptual self present in the modern brain likely required the
merging of pre-existing self networks with higher-level cortical
systems. The eventual integration of language and self-awareness
would have been advantageous for coordinating social groups
(Graziano, 2013), since experiencing self-referential thought as
inner speech facilitates verbal communication. Likewise, the
coupling of self-awareness to internal sensory, cognitive, and
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motor states (Metzinger, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006) may
be advantageous for maximizing information between systems
within an individual brain. Neuropsychological conditions
involving different forms of agnosia, neglect, and self-awareness
deficits do show that a reduced awareness of self-ownership
of motor skills, body parts, or perceptual states can result in
significant disability (Parton et al., 2004; Morin, 2006; Orfei
et al., 2007; Prigatano, 2009; Tsakiris, 2010; Overgaard, 2011;
Fabbro et al., 2015; Chokron et al., 2016). Since experiencing
self-awareness optimizes levels of mutual information between
the external world and the brain’s internal model (Apps and
Tsakiris, 2014), and this activity decreases thermodynamic
entropy (Torday and Miller, 2016), self-awareness may be
a mechanism for optimizing the brain’s consumption of
energy.
Thermodynamic information is also interesting to consider
in the context of free will. The brain is predictable within
reason, and the performance of an action can be predicted
before a decision is reported to have been made (Haggard,
2008). Entities such as ideas, feelings, and beliefs seem to exist
as effectively deterministic evaluations of information processed
in the brain. Whether or not the flow of information is
subject to the brain’s volitional alteration, neuroscience also
shows that information can be internally real to a system
of the brain, even if this information is inconsistent with
an external reality. That the brain can generate an externally
inconsistent internal reality is demonstrated by phenomena such
as confabulation, agnosia, blindsight, neglect, commissurotomy
and hemispherectomy effects, placebo and nocebo effects,
reality monitoring deficits, hallucinations, prediction errors,
the suspension of disbelief during dreaming, the function of
communication in minimizing divergence between internal
realities, the quality of many kinds of realistic drug-induced
experiences, and the effects of many neuropsychological
conditions. The apparent fact that subjective reality is an active
construction of the physical brain has even led to the proposal
of model-dependent realism (Hawking and Mlodinow, 2011)
as a philosophical paradigm in the search for a unified theory
of physics. In any case, it is likely that beliefs, including
those in free will, exist as information, and that their internal
reality is a restatement of its frequently observer-dependent
nature.
EMPIRICAL OUTLOOK
Before concluding, it is worth reviewing a few notable
experiments in greater detail. While considerable advances have
been made in discovering how neurobiological systems operate
according to principles of thermodynamic efficiency (Sterling and
Laughlin, 2015), relationships between information and energy
in the brain are only beginning to be understood. The following
studies are examples of elegant and insightful experiments that
should inspire future research.
Several recent brain imaging studies support the proposal
(Annila, 2016) that thermodynamics is able to explain a number
of mysteries involving consciousness. For example, Stender
et al. (2016) used PET to measure global resting state energy
consumption in 131 brain injury patients with impairments
of consciousness as defined by the revised Coma Recovery
Scale (CRS-R). The preservation of consciousness was found
to require a minimal global metabolic rate of ≈ 40% of the
average rate of controls; global energy consumption above
this level was reported to predict the presence or recovery of
consciousness with over 90% sensitivity. These results must
be replicated and studied in closer detail before their specific
theoretical implications are clear, but it is now established that
levels of consciousness are correlated with energetic metrics
of brain activity. To what extent there exists a well-defined
“minimal energetic requirement for the presence of conscious
awareness” (Stender et al., 2016) remains an open question.
However, the empirical confirmation of a connection between
consciousness and thermodynamics introduces the possibility
of developing new experimental methods in consciousness
research.
Neurobiological systems, and biological systems in general
(Von Baeyer, 1999; Schneider and Sagan, 2005), can be
considered thermodynamic demons in the sense that they
are agents using information to decrease their thermodynamic
entropy. Landauer’s principle requires that, in order not to
violate any known laws of thermodynamics, such agents dissipate
heat when erasing information from their memory storage
devices. In an experimental test of this principle, reviewed
along with similar experiments in Parrondo et al. (2015) and
Bérut et al. (2012) studied heat dissipation in a simple memory
device created by placing a glass bead in an optical double-well
potential. Intuitively, this memory stored a bit of information
by retaining the bead on one side of the potential rather than
on the alternative. By manipulating the height of the optical
barrier between wells, researchers moved the bead to one side
of the memory without determining its previous location in
the potential. This process was therefore logically irreversible,
requiring the erasure of prior information from the memory
device. Landauer’s principle predicts that, since information is
conserved, the entropy of the memory’s surroundings must
increase when this occurs. Bérut et al. (2012) have verified that
energy is emitted when a memory is cleared. As noted by the
authors, “this limit is independent of the actual device, circuit or
material used to implement the irreversible operation.” It would
be interesting to study the erasure principle in the context of
neuroscience.
Experimental applications of information theory in cell
biology have already led to the discovery of general principles
of brain organization related to thermodynamics (Sterling and
Laughlin, 2015). In one particularly interesting study, Niven
et al. (2007) measured the energetic efficiency of information
coding in retinal neurons. Intracellular recordings of membrane
potential and input resistance were used to calculate rates
of ATP consumption in response to different background
light intensities. These rates of energy consumption were then
compared with rates of Shannon information transmission
in order to determine metabolic performance. It was found
that metabolic demands increase non-linearly with respect
to increases in information processing rate: thermodynamics
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appears to impose a “law of diminishing returns” on systems
of the brain. The authors interpret these results as evidence
that nature has selected for neurons that minimize unnecessary
information processing. Studying how thermodynamics has
influenced cellular parameters over the course of evolution is
likely to raise many new empirically addressable questions.
CONCLUSION
This article has reviewed information-energy relationships
in the hope that they may eventually provide a general
framework for uniting theory and experiment in neuroscience.
The physical nature of information and its status as a finite,
measurable resource are emphasized to connect neurobiology
and thermodynamics. As a scientific paradigm, the information
movement currently underway in physics promises profound
advances in our understanding of the relationship between
energy, information, and the physical brain.
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